Showing posts with label economic indicators. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economic indicators. Show all posts

Monday, July 27, 2009

Risk of credit card default in Ireland intensifies

visa US consumers are bearing a personal debt burden in excess of €1,732 billion and the IMF estimates that over €240 billion of this will not be repaid.  The credit crisis there started with sub-prime mortgages then moved to mainstream mortgages, car loans and, most recently, to credit card debt.

There has been an increase in US credit card debt default as unemployment there rises to over 9%.  The incidence of credit card debt default in the States typically mirrored their unemployment level.  The personal debt default trend in Europe is also deteriorating but has not been as severe as in the US.

The ratio of consumer debt to income has been rising to about 140% in the US.  It hovered around the 90% mark in the last recession.

This begs the question – what is happening in Ireland?  Irish politicians usually attempt to put the best possible spin on a glaringly adverse trend, with remarks such as “the rate of deterioration has slowed”.  It is true that the level of personal credit card debt in Ireland has declined as consumer confidence has waned and retail sales levels have collapsed by over 20% in the case of the high street and by over 60% in the case of vehicles.  However, the number unemployed has risen dramatically and if defaults by Irish credit card users were to mirror the American experience, credit cards providers will be seeing a growth of over 100% in irrecoverable debts, as the following table illustrates:

End
Feb

Personal credit card debt

Number unemployed

Unemployment Rate

Debt default
risk

2009

€889.5M

222,800

10.2%

€88.95M

2008

€1,092.6M

109,400

4.9%

€53.53M

2007

€1,008.1M

98,100

4.5%

€45.36M

2006

€870.9M

88,200

4.4%

€38.31M

 

The Central Statistics Office reported on 25 June that employment in Ireland had fallen by 7.5% in 2009 to 1,965,000 persons.  Full-time employment dropped by 176,200 in the past year.  The decline in the Irish labour market is being attributed to a decline in participation by 46,000 persons.  There is also a demographic aspect.  The Irish  labour force has grown through net inward migration which reached a peak in early 2006 when the labour force growth was over 100,000 persons and 70,000 of this was accounted for by immigrants.  There is now a lower level of net inward migration.

Business Exposure to Indebted Consumers’

Businesses are being obliged to pay much greater attention to the risks associated with customers dependent on credit and how to manage exposure to this.   Three benchmarks to keep track of include the ratio of credit sales to cash sales, gross profit and operating income.  The objective is to moderate the consequences of any change to a customer’s credit position.  Studies have demonstrated that credit card sales are more volatile as a consequence of changes in credit limits; transactions fees that can rise as defaults rise and these are borne by traders.  If a credit card processor should go out of business the risk accruing to traders will increase.  If the proportion of credit card users who default that a particular business does business with becomes disproportionate the risk borne by the trader increases.

It would be clearly absurd to abandon credit card sales but it is important to consistently monitor associated risk and volatility.

Wednesday, July 1, 2009

No evidence of any mid-year green shoots of recovery

downturn Today is the first day of the second half of 2009 and the latest data to assess our economic wellbeing does not provide grounds for reassurance, optimism or encouragement.

Employment and Unemployment

One of the great consequences of our EU membership and the economic growth that it enabled was the expansion in employment numbers and in the population of the country. Approximately one million people had a job in Ireland around 1990, a period when all the economic indicators and the level of government debt and the interest liability on it was punitive. Our labour force in March of last year comprised 2.23 million persons. A year later, 1.965 million persons had a full or part-time job in Ireland, a fall of 7.5%. The number unemployed at the end of March was 222,800 - an unemployment rate of 10.2% that has subsequently exceeded 11%. The most worrying aspect is that the long-term unemployment rate has increased from 1.7% last October to 2.2% last March.

There were over 418,000 persons listed on the Live Register at the end of June, an increase of over 197,000 in twelve months. This number includes persons unemployed , part-timers and seasonal workers.

 

Gross Domestic Product

Personal consumer spending, in volume terms, was 9.1% lower in the first quarter of 2009. Capital investment declined by 34.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2009 compared to the first quarter of 2008. This has resulted in a record GDP contraction of 8.5% in Q1 2009.

Anglo Irish Bank

The first Interim Report, since nationalisation, for the 6-month period to 31 March 2009 indicated that the capital base of this wretched bank has been effectively wiped out. There was an instant demand for a €4 billion capital investment by the Government with the high probability that a further €7 billion will be necessary.  The Government parted with €3 billion this week and God alone knows what the owners of that money will ever obtain for it.

This Bank built its business almost exclusively on property development and speculation. The hypothesis upon which it functioned was predicated on its customers achieving a 30-60% cash return on the sites they developed. The ensuing burden eventually mortally crushed the financial spine of struggling house buyers and the taxpaying public are now expected to bridge the enormous and unascertainable gap.

But the taxpaying public have not been introduced to the interplanetary world of bling-incarnate and the faces and the circumstances behind these impaired loans.

The public have been told about a proposed business plan that is intended to:

  • Rebuild trust and confidence in the Bank
  • Maximise the recoverability of loans, and
  • Reduce the cost base

Rebuilding trust and confidence

A fundamental component of trust and confidence is candour, honesty and openness. The conclusion of the protracted but ongoing investigation by the Garda Fraud Squad and the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement is an absolute prerequisite.  Bernie Madoff needs some shamrock-wearing, shillellagh-shaking companions from the universe of moral hazard!

Ireland’s contemporary introduction to the concept of ‘systemic importance’ was in 2007 when the palaver was put about which suggested that the massive high-density developments proposed for Ballsbridge, Dublin with projected construction costs north of €1 billion, would ‘have to win planning approval’ because the big property developers were too big to fail’. No consideration was given to the economic sustainability of this development at a consumer level by Anglo and other finance providers. The developer who described economic commentators then as laughing hyenas – harbingers’ of doom and gloom’ has proven to be myopic and certainly not infallible.

Anglo is now a State owned business with a single shareholder. It is no longer a business with 17,111 shareholders’ who owned 89.2% of the equity; - who were fed a bill of fare by your predecessor about “the excellent performance…of a relationship based business … grounded in the Group’s disciplined and focused business model … prudent risk appetite and very limited exposure to areas affected by the current credit market issues”.

 

Maximising the Recoverability of Loans

The most devastating information in the Interim Report is that Anglo Irish Bank, the State-owned bank lent €175 million to 10 directors and 2 managers and that €31 million of this is impaired, against corresponding deposits of only €20 million - €8 million less than a year earlier. This is not merely a debt but it is the stripping away of national self-respect. What other State system of corporate governance would tolerate incumbent directors of major public companies being a party to impaired directors’ loans raised in a bank of which they were directors and appointees to the Risk and Compliance Committee?

The impaired loans of directors and managers of Anglo align Ireland more closely with Harare than with London, Frankfurt, New York or Geneva. What is the difference between the Zimbabwean taxpayers’ picking up the tab for the extravagant shopping trips to Hong Kong and Paris by Mrs Robert Mugabe while their citizens die from cholera? The difference with Ireland is one of scale and disease type. Our liabilities are much greater and our people will die of cervical cancer rather than cholera because resources committed to Anglo are not available for cervical screening.

Secondly, will this incidence of directors’ loans impairment not set a very low ceiling on the prospects of debt recoverability, causing further exposure to moral hazard? Developers will be thrilled and their legal advocates will argue that their client’s obligations should not be dealt with differently, or more urgently, than those of the directors’ and mangers’ who recommended and approved their loans, possibly completed on-site reviews at least twice a year and stress tested the impact of potential adverse consequences.

Religious congregations on whose sites half-finished properties exist will wonder will they ever reap the agreed selling price that was to have been paid on project completion.

Reducing the cost base of the Bank

The bonus culture meant that average salaries at Anglo Irish Bank almost equate in extravagance to the salary and pension combination of politicians. The average salary reported in the Interim Report is equivalent to €96,976 for staff numbers reduced from 1,922 to 1,753. This is a reduction of the corresponding annual figure of over €137,000 in 2006 and 2007.

The average salary estimated to be paid in 2009 in the Department of Finance is €58,600. The average salary estimated to paid, in 2009, in the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, who will hopefully be directly involved with former executives of the Bank, is €68,635. The average at Bank of Ireland, a business like that of Anglo, with activities in Ireland, Britain and the US, is €74,426.

When this is considered in the context of there being no value added at the Bank since September beyond dealing with existing customers the overhead seems exorbitant.

Credit Crunch

It is not surprising that as personal consumption collapses through lack of confidence that that demand for credit is also lower. Outstanding private sector credit amounted to €389.6 billion at the end of May.  This declined by €981 million, €185 million of which is attributable to lower personal credit in May. But the overall amount outstanding is equivalent to over  twice the annual level of total personal consumption on goods and services – in other words, a lot of lolly.  That explosion of private sector credit mirrors what occurred in Iceland.

There were 2,203,000 credit cards in issue to individuals in Ireland at the end of May, a number broadly comparable to a year earlier. New monthly spending on these personal cards has moderated from over €1 billion in June 2008 to €801 million at the end of May. The growth in the level of indebtedness of them at the end of May has moderated to 0.1% compared to 4.4% last January and 19.6% in March 2007. Residential mortgages fell by over €100 million in April and by a further €18 million in May, a trend that is not surprising when the number of planning permission sought in Q1 2009 was 23.7% lower than a year earlier.

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

Ireland’s wilting personal wealth

euro The nest-egg of the average Irish household has declined by 42% from €95,022 in 2006 to €55,113 at the end of 2008.

This downturn is reflected in the financial assets owned by the households of Ireland. Net financial assets fell by €36.1 billion to €81.2 billion in 2008.

The Central Statistics Office has just issued a balance sheet of net financial assets for 2008 and this reveals the following downward trend:

 

€ Billion

2005

2006

2007

2008

Financial Assets, Jan 1

234.3

269.0

307.8

308.3

Net acquisitions

18.2

13.1

10.6

8.9

Valuation changes

16.4

25.8

-10.1

-34.7

Financial assets, Dec 31

269.0

307.8

308.3

282.5

Liabilities, 1 Jan

110.3

140.1

167.9

191

New borrowing

29.9

27.8

23.2

10.5

Valuation changes

0

0

-0.2

-0.1

Liabilities, 31 Dec

140.1

167.9

191.4

201.4

Net financial assets, 1 Jan

124.1

128.8

139.9

117.1

+ financial transactions

-11.7

-14.8

-12.6

-1.7

+valuations changes

16.4

25.8

-10.0

-34.4

Net financial assets,
31 Dec

128.8

139.9

117.3

81.2

Financial assets include deposits, shares and securities other than shares, life insurance and pensions, accounts receivable and liabilities comprise mainly loans, both short and long-term.

The decline in new borrowing from €23.2 billion in 2007 to €10.5 billion last year is both a reflection of the credit crunch and a decline in the demand for mortgages.  The main cause in the decline in personal wealth is the collapse in the valuation of financial assets in 2007 and 2008.

The 2006 Census of Irish Population indicated that there were 1,473,345 occupied houses in Ireland, an average of 2.81 persons per household. There were a further 296,000 vacant houses and apartments, including 50,000 holiday homes.

Residential construction was one of the major sources of taxation during the boom. The residential sector alone yielded over €1 billion in 2006 and 2007 but the total anticipated yield from stamp duties in 2009 is only €980 million.

The Irish economy is suffering the catastrophic consequences of a property bubble funded by Irish banks who raised the wherewithal on wholesale markets in Ireland and elsewhere.  The economy has been in damage-limitation mode since last Autumn.  The first initiative was the State guarantee of customer deposits, (or bank liabilities).  Ireland, I believe was the first of many countries to make this move last September.  The second step has been the recapitalisation of the banks using the resources of the National Pension Reserve Fund for this purpose.  The third initiative has been the establishment of a ‘bad bank’, the National Asset Management Agency.  A review of the banking sector is outstanding both in terms of its fitness for purpose, regulation and scope of activities.  Some consolidation is anticipated together with the removal of reckless and  incompetent bankers.  The sector has all the characteristics of a dysfunctional family for the time being with grandparents taking over parenting duties.  Old geysers, who have been retired for years are turning up in board rooms, some of whom never worked in the sector and who know as much about banking as I do about high-end prostitution!